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1. Introduction 
Since the pioneering work of Akerlof (1970), economists have regarded the presence of 
asymmetric information as one of the main sources of market failure.  The adverse 
selection problem points to the fact that prices that the uninformed side of the market is 
willing to pay for the expected quality are unacceptable for those agents at the informed 
side of the market that possess the better qualities.  As a consequence, in any market 
equilibrium good quality products do not change ownership (see also, Wilson, 1979, 1980).  
Subsequent work has investigated the extent to which non-market institutions can reveal 
information about quality.  The role that is played by certification intermediaries, leasing, 
guarantees and other institutions in durable goods markets that suffer from adverse 
selection has recently been studied by Guha and Waldman (1997), Lizzeri (1999) and 
Waldman (1999), among others.  This paper, in contrast, is driven by a more basic 
question, namely: to what extent can the market mechanism itself, by changing prices over 
time, provide adequate incentives for sellers of different qualities to sort themselves over 
time?  This question is relevant in markets where goods have a use value that extends over 
some time periods and where high quality goods have a higher use value than low quality 
goods.  In such an environment preferring not to sell can be a signal of having good 
quality.1 
Durability introduces some additional factors that are not explicitly taken into account 
in the static model: goods not traded in any period can be offered for sale in the future and, 
in addition, new cohorts of potential sellers may enter the market over time.  Janssen and 
Roy (1999a, 1999b) and Janssen and Karamychev (2000) have investigated some of the 
issues that arise when durability is explicitly taken into account in a dynamic model.  All 
these papers study models where markets open and close in different time periods.  Janssen 
and Roy (1999a) address the issue whether a given stock of goods can be traded over time.  
They show that in any dynamic competitive equilibrium all goods eventually will be 
traded.  The main idea behind this result is that given a sequence of prices high quality 
sellers have more incentives to wait (and enjoy a higher use value before selling) than low 
quality sellers do.  Once certain (low) qualities are sold, only relatively high qualities 
remain in the market.  Risk-neutral consumers can predict that sellers of different qualities 
                                                 
1 Taylor (1999) shows that when potential buyers can inspect quality, time on the market may be a signal of 
low, rather than of high quality.  We show in the context of a pure adverse selection model where quality 
inspection is too costly, a reverse result. 
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will sort themselves into different time periods and, hence, they are willing to pay higher 
prices in later periods.  The equilibrium is thus one in which higher qualities are sold in 
later periods at higher prices. 
Janssen and Roy (1999b) and Janssen and Karamychev (2000) address the same issue 
in the context of markets where identical cohorts of perfectly durable goods enter the market 
in each time period.  In such markets, the infinite repetition of the static equilibrium under 
adverse selection is an equilibrium in the dynamic model.  In fact, it is the unique 
stationary equilibrium and also the only equilibrium where prices and average quality 
traded are (weakly) monotonic over time.  These papers show that there exist other 
equilibria, however, where all goods are traded within finite time after they have entered 
the market.  These equilibria are cyclical in prices and quantities in the sense that once all 
goods are traded, prices (and quantities) will fall.  Up to the moment all goods are sold, 
however, the dynamic process of prices and quantities is monotonically increasing. 
This paper investigates which factors are driving the results obtained in Janssen and 
Roy (1999b) and Janssen and Karamychev (2000).  A first issue is whether it matters that 
trade takes place in discrete time.  Some markets (like financial markets) are characterized 
by continuous time trading and a continuous time model provides a better description of 
such markets than a discrete time model.2 We show that the continuous time model 
exhibits qualitatively similar properties as the discrete time model.  Second, in the discrete 
time dynamic models it is difficult to assess the role of the discount factor in determining 
the equilibrium path.  In the continuous time model, we are able to show that changes in 
the discount parameter only effect the speed with which goods can be traded rather than 
the qualitative properties of equilibrium trading.  Finally, as the continuous time model is 
easier to analyze, we are able to consider important extensions showing that similar results 
hold true when consumers are not risk-neutral, which is important in insurance markets, or 
when the good is not perfectly durable. 
Our basic model is as follows.  We consider a competitive market for a perfectly 
durable good where potential sellers are privately informed about the quality of the goods 
they own.  Each moment in time a constant flow of sellers with an identical but arbitrary 
distribution of quality enters the market.  In order to concentrate on the possibility of time 
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acting as a sorting mechanism, the demand side is kept as simple as possible in the basic 
model.  All buyers are identical, have unit demand and for any given quality, a buyer’s 
willingness to pay exceeds the reservation price of a seller for that quality.  As buyers do 
not know the quality, their willingness to pay equals the expected valuation of goods 
traded at a certain time.  The flow of such buyers into the market is larger than the flow of 
sellers so that, in equilibrium, prices are equal to the expected buyers' valuation.  Once 
traded, goods are not re-sold in the same market.3 
The Akerlof-Wilson model can be considered the static version of our basic model 
and adverse selection implies that in equilibrium only a certain range of low qualities is 
traded.  The infinitely repeated version of a static equilibrium outcome is also an 
equilibrium in our dynamic model.  In this particular equilibrium of the continuous time 
model high quality goods remain unsold forever. 
We concentrate on the existence of other equilibria with more interesting properties.  
A first result says that changes in the interest rate, which is related to changes in the 
discount factor in discrete models, do not affect the nature of equilibria in any way.  
Interest rates only determines the speed of evolution along an equilibrium path and in 
particular, higher interest rates implies a higher volume of trade at each moment as it is 
easier to separate goods of different quality.  Next, we argue that there are infinitely many 
equilibria where the range of quality which is eventually traded in the market exceeds that 
of the stationary (static) outcome.  Moreover, sellers of different qualities within the inflow 
of entrants separate themselves out over time.  As the use value of low quality goods is 
lower than that of high quality goods, low quality sellers sell earlier than high quality 
sellers.  A third, more powerful, result says that there exist an infinite number of equilibria 
where every potential seller entering the market trades within a finite time after entering 
the market.  When the quality distribution is such that there are relatively few sellers 
around the static equilibrium quality such equilibria only exist when we allow price to be a 
discontinuous function of time before all goods are sold. 
                                                                                                                                                    
2 Inderst and Muller (2000) study a continuous time model where a market consists of several sub-markets.  
They show in an endogenous search model, that high quality goods may be traded in sub-markets with high 
prices and low probability of selling. 
3 For example, in car markets, it is publicly observable how many owners a car has had up to particular point 
in time.  Hence, second hand markets may be distinguished from third-hand markets, and so on. 
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We also consider two extensions.  First, we show that the results obtained for the basic 
model easily extend to models that allow for risk averse or risk-loving behavior.  Second, 
we consider the case where goods are not perfectly durable but depreciate over time.  The 
main result we obtain here is that if the depreciation rate is low enough, i.e., if goods are 
"almost perfectly durable", the results of the basic model roughly hold true: eventually, all 
goods are sold (even those high quality goods that just came to the market and did not 
depreciate very much).  If the depreciation rate is higher, owners of high qualities will first 
wait until the quality of the good becomes worse before selling.  Stationary equilibria, 
different from the static equilibria, may then emerge where low quality "new" goods and 
depreciated goods that originally were of high quality are traded at the same time.  A full 
analysis of the depreciation case turns out to be rather complicated, however.  We indicate, 
mainly by resorting to examples, possible equilibrium phenomena. 
The results obtained in the paper provide a different perspective on the adverse 
selection problem.  In the static Akerlof-Wilson model, the adverse selection problem 
manifests itself in the fact that high quality goods cannot be traded despite the potential 
gains from trade.  When trade takes place in time and goods are durable, the lemons 
problem is not so much the impossibility of trading relatively high quality goods, but rather 
the fact that sellers of high quality goods need to wait in order to trade.  When the good is 
imperfectly durable, sellers of good qualities may have to wait until their good has 
depreciated enough before selling. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets out the basic model and the 
equilibrium concept.  Section 3 shows that for all distributions of goods entering the 
market, cyclical equilibria exist where, within a cycle, price and marginal quality are 
continuously increasing functions of time.  The main result of the paper relating to the 
existence of an infinite number of equilibria where all goods are traded within finite time 
after entering the market is outlined in section 4.  This section also shows that for a special 
class of distributions there exist equilibria such that, within a cycle, price and marginal 
quality are continuously increasing functions of time.  Section 5 discusses the extensions 
and section 6 concludes.  Proofs are contained in the Appendix. 
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2. The Basic Model 
Consider a Walrasian market for a perfectly durable good whose quality, denoted by q , 
varies between q  and q , where ¥<<< qq0 .  Time, denoted by t , is continuous and 
runs from zero up to infinity.  For every time moment t  a constant flow of sellers I  enters 
the market.  Let it  be the entry time of seller i  and let iq  be the quality he is endowed 
with.  The set of all sellers, therefore, is { } ( ){ }ii ti ,q==I .  We denote by ( )qm  the 
Lebesgue measure of sellers in the flow I  who own a good of quality less than or equal to 
q .  We assume that ( )qm  is strictly increasing absolutely continuous with respect to the 
Lebesgue measure and constant over time. 
Each seller i  knows the quality iq  of the good he is endowed with and derives flow 
utility from ownership of the good until he sells it.  Therefore, the seller's reservation price 
is the present discounted value of the flow of gross utility and we normalize this to be 
equal to iq .  This implies that the gross utility flow is irq , where r  is the discount rate. 
On the demand side there is an inflow of new buyers, which is larger in size than 
( )qm .  All buyers are identical and have unit demand.  A buyer's valuation of quality q  is 
equal to qv , where 1>v .  Thus, under full information, there are gains from trade.  All 
buyers know the ex ante quality distribution ( )qm  but do not know the quality of the good 
offered by a particular seller.  Goods that are once bought are not re-sold in the same 
market.  Buyers and sellers discount the future at the common rate r  and maximize their 
expected utility. 
We will denote by { }( )I ¢h  the expected quality of a good from seller i  that belongs to 
a certain subset IÌ¢I .  It follows that ( ) ( ) ( )ò ¢Î¢ ¢º¢ Ii iI IdI mqh m 1 , where { }( ) { }( )IiiI ¢Î=¢ mm .  
Adverse selection implies that { }( ) qh <Iv , i.e., the willingness to pay for the average 
quality in the population is lower then the reservation price of the seller of the bast quality.  
Thus, the static Akerlof-Wilson version of the model has a largest equilibrium quality, 
which we will denote by Sq . 
To simplify our analysis we introduce the following regularity assumption.  
Throughout this paper, we assume that this assumption holds. 
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Assumption 2.1.  The measure function ( )qm  is differentiable on =U [ qeq m ,-S ] for 
some 0>me .  Let ( ) qmq ddf = .  The function ( )qf  is strictly positive and Lipschitz-
continuous function, i.e., ( ) 0>³ ff eq  and for some fM  ( ) ( ) qqqq ¢¢-¢<¢¢-¢ fMff  for 
all UÎ¢¢¢ qq , . 
Given an evolution of market prices ( )tp , [ )¥Î ,0t , each seller i  chooses whether or 
not to sell and if he decides to sell, the selling time.  If he chooses not to sell his gross 
surplus is equal to iq  and, therefore, his net surplus equals zero.  On the other hand, if he 
decides to sell at time itt ³  his gross surplus becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )ittrittr
t
t
ttr
i tptpdtr ii
i
i qqq -+=+ ------ò eee , 
and, therefore, his net discounted surplus is equal to 
( ) ( )( )irti tpts q-= -e . 
The set of time moments in which it is optimal to sell for a seller i  is given by 
( )( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( ){ }iirt
tt
ii
tt
i tptptststpT
ii
qq ³-=³º -
³³
emaxarg0maxarg . 
If 0<- itp q  for all itt ³  then ( )( ) Æ=tpTi . 
Each potential seller i  chooses a time ii TÎt  when to sell.  Let { } Iô Î= iit  be a set of 
all selling decisions.  This implies that there is a flow of goods being offered for sale.  We 
will denote this flow by tJ  and it follows that { }tiJ it =º t .  This generates a certain 
distribution of qualities in that flow and the expected quality of the goods offered for sale 
in time moment t  is { }( )tt Jhh = . 
A dynamic equilibrium is an equilibrium where all players rationally maximize their 
objectives, expectations are fulfilled and market always clears.  As all buyers are identical 
they have identical expectations about quality at any time t , which are denoted by ( )tE . 
Definition 2.1.  A dynamic equilibrium is described in terms of a path of prices ( )tp , 
buyers' quality expectations ( )tE  and a set of selling decision { } Iô Î= iit  such that: 
a) Sellers maximize: ( )( )tpTii Ît  for all Ii Î , i.e., every seller i  chooses time it  to 
trade optimally. 
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b) Buyers maximize and market clear: If { }( ) 0>tJm  then ( ) ( )tvEtp = , i.e., if at time 
t  there is a strictly positive flow of goods offered for sale, then each buyer earns zero 
net surplus so that he is indifferent between buying and not buying and market clears.  
If { }( ) 0=tJm  then ( ) ( )tvEtp ³ , i.e., if there are (almost) no goods for sale at time t  
then each buyer can earn at most zero net surplus.  Hence, it is optimal for him not to 
buy at that time as well. 
c) Expectations are fulfilled when trade occurs : If { }( ) 0>tJm  then ( ) ttE h= . 
d) Expectations are reasonable even if no trade occurs: For all t  ( ) q³tE . 
Given the set-up described above, conditions (a)-(c) are quite standard.  Condition (d) 
is introduced for the formal reason that expected quality is not defined when no trade 
occurs.  The condition says that even if the flow of goods offered for sale is zero, buyers 
should believe that the expected quality is larger than the apriori lowest possible quality.  
This condition assures that autarky, i.e., no trade at any time, cannot be sustained in an 
equilibrium of the dynamic model.  Given the condition, the willingness to pay, hence the 
price at any time, is restricted from below by qv  and sellers with low enough qualities 
prefer to sell against this price rather than not sell. 
It is easily seen that the infinitely repeated outcome of the static model, i.e., ( ) Stp q=  
and sellers with quality Îiq [ Sqq, ] sell immediately upon entering the market, is a 
dynamic equilibrium of our model.  Hence, an equilibrium always exists.  In the next 
section we will show that in the dynamic model there are infinitely many other equilibria.  
In all these other equilibria eventually more goods with higher qualities are sold than in the 
static equilibrium. 
3. Multiple Equilibria 
We will now show that for any distribution of quality entering the market and for all values 
of the parameters v  and r  there exists an infinite number of dynamic equilibria trading all 
goods from a certain range [ qq ˆ, ], where Îqˆ ( qq ,S ].  The arguments we provide show 
how to find a price path ( )tp  that entirely determines the dynamic equilibrium.  All the 
equilibria are cyclical in the sense that the function ( )tp  is periodical, i.e., for some 0>T  
and for all [ )¥Î ,0t  ( ) ( )tpTtp =+ .  Within the cycle ( )tp  is strictly increasing. 
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We start our analysis by arguing that if a good of certain quality sells at time t , then 
all goods with lower qualities that have entered the market before (and are still in the 
market) will also sell at that time.  Given any ( )tp  a seller i  of quality iq  by selling at 
time t  earns a net discounted surplus ( )( )irt tp q--e .  Maximizing this expression4 yields 
the first order conditions: 
a) ( ) ii t=qt  if ( ) ( )iii trprtp £+ q& , or 
b) ( )( ) ( )( )iii rprp qtqqt =+&  if ( ) ( )iii trprtp >+ q& . 
The second order condition is simply ( ) ( )tt prp &&& <  if ( ) ii t>qt . 
We first will look for equilibria that satisfy the second order condition for all iq .  This 
implies that for any given iq  the optimal selling time ( )iqt  is unique if it exists.5 Then, the 
first order condition (a) says that a seller should sell immediately upon entering the market, 
i.e., at time it , if the benefit of using a good rather than selling at time it , i.e., the use value 
of the good irq  plus capital gain ( )itp& , is smaller than the opportunity cost of owing the 
good at the entry time, which is equal to ( )itrp .  If, on the other hand, the benefit is larger 
than the cost, then the seller should wait until the moment they are equal to each other and 
sell at that time (condition b). 
It follows that if a seller of quality iq  sells at time t  then all sellers with qualities from 
the range [ iqq, ], who are in the market at time t , also prefer to sell at that time t .  This 
allows us to define for any t  a marginal seller ( )tq  as the seller of the highest quality at 
time t : 
( ) { } ( ) ( )tptpJit rti
i
&1sup -=Î= qq , or 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ttprtp q-=& . (1) 
Differentiating (1) gives 
( ) qq &&&&&&& -=--=- prprprp , 
which implies that the second order condition requires ( )tq  to be an increasing function. 
                                                 
4 Implicitly, we have assumed that ( )tp  is twice differentiable.  As we will see, the solution that we obtain is 
such that this assumption is satisfied. 
5 We will see that there are equilibria such that high quality sellers will never sell.  If this is the case then the 
first order conditions are never satisfied for them and the optimal selling time does not exist. 
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Having established that a flow of goods offered for sale at any time t  is a range of 
qualities [ ( )tqq, ], we denote by ( )qh  the expected quality of goods from I  conditional on 
those goods having a quality in the range [ qq, ] and it follows that ( ) ( ) ò=
q
q
qm mqqh d1 . 
Now we are able to derive the main equation that must be satisfied along the 
equilibrium path.  Let us consider an infinitely short time interval ( )dttt +,  such that 
( ) Ut Îq .  All qualities that entered before and at time t  from the interval [ ( )tqq, ] have 
already been traded and all qualities from ( ( ) qq ,t ] that have entered before are still in the 
market.  Then the measure of goods with quality less than q , which are in the market at the 
moment dtt + , becomes 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )îí
ì
>-++
<
=+ ttdttdtt
tdt
dtt qqqmqmqm
qqqm
qm
for 
for 
, (2) 
and the expected quality from the range [ ( )dtt +qq, ] will be 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,tttft
tttftt
ddttddt
ddttddt
dtt
t
t
dtt
t
t
t qqqm
qqqqhqm
VmVm
VmVVmV
h
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
&
&
+
+=
++
++
=
òò
òò
+
+
 
as ( ) 0>tq& .  Therefore, price at time t  must be equal to 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) .qqqm
qqqqhqm
&
&
tf
tf
vp
+
+=  
Rewriting gives 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) .pvtf
vp
-
-=
qq
qhqmq&  
Together with (1) we have finally obtained the following system 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( )ïî
ï
í
ì
-
-=
-=
pvtf
vp
prp
qq
qhqmq
q
&
&
, (3) 
which describes the evolution of price and marginal quality along an equilibrium path.  
Note that 0>q&  and 0>p&  as long as ( )qhvp >  and qq vp << . 
We first argue that the set of dynamic equilibria is independent of the interest rate.  
The parameter r  only determines the speed with which prices and marginal qualities 
change over time.  To this end, we rescale time by the parameter r  as rt=y , where y  is 
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a new "time" variable.  Then the net discounted surplus of a seller i  if he decides to sell at 
"time" iirtrt yy º³=  against the price ( )yp~ , becomes 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ii ps i qyy yy -= -- ~e~ . 
Hence, the marginal seller at "time" y  will be a function ( )yq~  of y .  Finally, along an 
equilibrium path ( ) { }( )yhy Jvp ~~ = , where yJ~  is the set of sellers with qualities smaller than 
( )yq~  who have entered before or just at "time" y .  So, we have closed the system in y  
while r  drops out from all conditions to be satisfied except one: now the inflow of agents 
(buyers and sellers) become r
1  times larger (as the new "time" variable y  is r
1  times 
denser than the old one) and we have to use a new measure function ( ) ( )qmqm r1~ = .  On the 
other hand, expected quality ( )yy hh J~=  does not depend on the size of the flow yJ~ , but 
only on the distribution of quality.  Thus, r  disappears completely from our analysis and 
we have our first result. 
Proposition 3.1.  The set of dynamic equilibria of the model does not depend on the 
interest rate r .  The interest rate only determines the speed of the evolution along an 
equilibrium path. 
Using Proposition 3.1 we restrict the analysis without loss of generality to the case 
1=r  and consider system (3) for that case only.  Figure 3.1 shows the vector field of the 
system for some 0>t ,6 which is given by 
( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )qhqm
qqq
qq vp
ppvf
t
p
d
dp
-
--== &
&
. 
As ( ) tvtp h=  and ( )tt qh <  no dynamic path that is a solution to system (3) can be above 
the line qvp = .  On the other hand, for any solution to be a dynamic equilibrium it must 
satisfy q³p , i.e., the surplus of the marginal seller may not be negative.  For all 
intermediate values of prices p , qq vp << , 0>qd
dp .  Finally, if ( )qhvp =  then 0=q&  and 
tangents at such points are vertical for any 0>t . 
                                                 
6 This is non-autonomous system and the vector field changes over time. 
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Our objective, therefore, is to show that there exists a neighborhood U  such that for 
any UÎ0q  system (3) with initials ( ) ( ) ( )000 0 and 0 qhqq vpp ===  has a solution 
( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt , like the solution denoted by the dotted line in Figure 3.1, with q³p .  
What we will prove then in Proposition 3.2 is that for all UÎ0q  there exists a time 
( ) 00 >qT  such that all equilibrium conditions are fulfilled, prices and marginal qualities 
increase over the time interval ( )( )0,0 qT  and either ( ) qqq =0,T  or ( ) ( ) STpT qqqq >= 00 ,, .  
In both cases ( )0,qq T  is the largest quality that can be traded and we can extend 
( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt  in a periodic way, namely by defining ( ) ( )tpTtp =+  and ( ) ( )tTt qq =+ , 
in this way we obtain a dynamic equilibrium where all goods from the range [ qq ˆ, ] are 
traded with ( )Tqq =ˆ . 
Proposition 3.2.  There exists an infinite number of dynamic equilibria trading all goods 
from a certain range [ qq ˆ, ], where ( ]qqq ,ˆ SÎ . 
Proposition 3.2 implies that the repetition of the static equilibrium is the only 
stationary equilibrium.  If we choose any arbitrary Sqq <0 , the dynamic path will be such 
that eventually more than the static equilibrium amount of goods will be sold. 
Figure 3.1. 
p
q=p
qq
qv
qvp =
( )qhvp =
Sq
U
 13
4. Equilibria Trading All Goods 
So far, we have shown that for all distributions we can trade more than the static 
equilibrium quality if we allow for trade to take place over time.  In this section we extend 
this result by showing that all goods can be traded if we relax the assumption about 
continuity of ( )tp . 
In the following Proposition 4.1 we show that there exists an infinite number of 
cyclical dynamic equilibria where all goods are traded at time K,3,2, TTT . 
Proposition 4.1.  There exists an infinite number of dynamic equilibria ( ) ( )( )tpt ,q  such 
that for some T : 
a) ( ) ( )tpTtp =+  and ( ) ( )tTt qq =+ ; 
b) ( ) qq =T ; 
c) ( )tq  and ( )tp  are strictly increasing functions for all ( )Tt ,0Î  except (at most) at a 
finite number of points ( ){ }Kkkt 1=  where both functions are discontinuous. 
Figure 4.1 represents a typical equilibrium path ( )tq .  Within each cycle n , where 
( )( ]TnnTt 1, +Î , the path is piecewise continuous, i.e., ( )tq  is a solution of (3) for every 
subcycle Ît ( ( ) ( )1, -kk tt ], Kk ,,2,1 K= , where K  is a finite number defined in the proof of 
Proposition 4.1.  The equilibrium construction is such that all sellers of quality Sq  earn the 
same discounted surplus by selling at ( )ktt = , 1,,1,0 -= Kk K .  Hence, they are indifferent 
between selling at each of these moments. 
The discontinuities described in Figure 4.1 are used to build up enough time and high 
quality goods to allow the expected quality to improve enough to trade all goods.  One may 
Figure 4.1. 
t
( )tq
Sq
q
T( )0t( )1t( )2t( )3t ( )3tT +( )40 t= ( )2tT +
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wonder whether these discontinuities are required for all distributions of quality.  Next, we 
will show that for certain distributions we can construct infinitely many equilibrium paths 
with ( )tq  and ( )tp  being continuous and strictly increasing over the whole cycle ( )T,0 .  In 
the proof of Proposition 3.2 we have defined ( )Saa q=  and a function ( )qa  on U  as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )qhqqqhq qmq -=º vfva dd 1 , (4) 
We will now show that this parameter a  plays a crucial role in analyzing when continuous 
price equilibria exist.  First, we will provide an economic interpretation of the parameter a  
and argue that generically, it must be that 10 << a .  To this end, consider the surplus of 
the marginal seller in the static model, denoted by ( )Ss , as a function of q : 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) qqmqqqhqqq
q
qqm
-=-=-º ò dvvps S 1 , and 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )add
d
v
d
ds
S
S
S
--=-÷ø
öçè
æ= ò 111 qqmqqq
q q
qqm
. 
Hence, a-1  can be interpreted as the way in which the surplus of the marginal seller 
changes in the neighborhood of the largest static equilibrium quality.  Using a Tailor 
expansion, the surplus of the marginal seller can be written as 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )SSSSSddSSSS oaosss qqqqqqqqqqq q -+---=-+-+º 1 . 
Suppose then that 1>a .7  This would imply that ( )( ) 0>qSs  in some right neighborhood of 
Sq .  But this contradicts the assumption that Sq  is the highest static equilibrium quality.  
Hence, generically, 1<a .  Lastly, ( ) 0>qa  under Assumption 2.1. 
It turns out that the value a
a-1  determines the qualitative behavior of ( )yx ˆ,ˆ  and that the 
functions ( )txˆ  and ( )tyˆ  behave quite differently depending on whether aa-1  is smaller or 
larger than 1, i.e., whether a  is larger or smaller than 21 .
8  Figure 4.2 shows the solution 
( )yx ˆ,ˆ  as a parametric function ( )xy ˆˆ  with the parameter t , for two different values of a , 
1.0=a  and 6.0=a .  One can see that in the former case ( )xy ˆˆ  oscillates around the origin 
so that the second order condition ( 0>q& ) is not satisfied.  In case 6.0=a  ( )txˆ  and ( )tyˆ  
are increasing functions so that in the neighborhood of the static equilibrium quality, prices 
and marginal qualities are increasing functions as well. 
                                                 
7 The case where 1=a  is a non-generic case. 
8 In the proof of Proposition 4.1 we use the so-called Kummer's function (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972, pp. 
504-515) with 
a
a-1  as one of the parameters. 
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Proposition 4.2 constructs for quality distributions with 2
1>a  equilibria trading all 
goods where price and marginal quality are continuous in every cycle.  It is easy to see that 
in case quality is uniformly distributed ( )( ) ( ) qqqq -+º 2vSs  and 2va = .  As, adverse 
selection implies 21 << v , it is clear that the uniform distribution satisfies this condition. 
Proposition 4.2.  If 2
1>a , then there exists an infinite number of cyclical dynamic 
equilibria ( ) ( )( )tpt ,q  such that: 
a) ( ) ( )tpTtp =+  and ( ) ( )tTt qq =+ ; 
b) ( ) qq =T ; 
c) ( )tq  and ( )tp  are strictly increasing and continuous functions on ( )T,0 . 
The result obtained in Proposition 4.2 says that in case 21>a  we can choose ( )0q  
sufficiently close to Sq  such that we do not need to build more than one subcycle in order 
to build up enough time and high quality goods to allow the expected quality to improve 
enough to trade all goods.  Basically, the condition 21>a  says that in a neighborhood of 
Sq  there is a sufficient mass of goods so that at the moment when the marginal quality 
becomes larger then Sq , the marginal seller is able to make a positive surplus. 
Figure 4.2. 
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5. Extensions 
So far, we have mainly focussed on the issue whether the evolution of market prices can be 
such that sellers of different qualities sort themselves over time.  To this end, the demand 
side of the model has been kept as simple as possible.  Also, we have considered the case 
of perfectly durable goods.  In this section we relax these assumptions.  We first consider a 
much larger class of preferences, including risk averse and risk loving behavior.  In the 
context of adverse selection applications risk aversion is important when considering 
insurance markets.  Next, we focus on the case where goods depreciate over time allowing 
us to address the case of imperfectly durable goods. 
5.1 More General Demand Structure  
The basic model can be easily extended to incorporate more general demand structures.  
Suppose that a buyer's valuation of quality q  is equal to ( )qv , where ( ) vv eqq >-  and 
vd
dv eq >  for some 0>ve  and all Îq [ qq, ], i.e., a buyers' valuation of a good of quality q  
is given by an arbitrary function such that (i) there are gains from trade under the full 
information, and (ii) higher quality goods are valued more than lower qualities.  Having 
bought a good of quality q  at time itt ³  against price ( )tp , a buyer derives utility 
( )( )pvu -q , where ( ) 00 =u  and 0>>¢ uu e .  This utility function allows for risk averse, 
risk neutral and risk loving preferences.  The rest of the model remains as before. 
In any equilibrium the expected buyers' utility must be equal to zero, i.e., 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 0=-ò
t
tdtpvu
q
q
qmq , (5) 
where ( )qmt  is the distribution of qualities within the flow of goods being offered for sale 
at time t .  In this environment the static equilibrium is defined by ( )( ) 0=-ò S dvu S
q
q
mqq . 
As the supply side is modeled in the same way the first differential equation (1) 
remains the same as well as the second order condition saying ( ) 0>tq& .  In order to get the 
second differential equation we consider an infinitely short time interval ( )dttt +,  such 
that ( ) Ut Îq .  Given the quality distribution (2), we can rewrite (5) as 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0=-+-ò tttftptvuxdtpxvu
t
qqqm
q
q
& , or 
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( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )tptvuttf
tptF
tptvuttf
xdtpxvu
t
t
-
=
-
-
-= ò
qq
q
qq
m
q
q
q ,& , 
where ( ) ( )( ) ( )ò --º
q
q
mq xdpxvupF ,  is differentiable in both arguments and strictly 
increasing in p .  By definition ( ) 0, =SSF qq . 
Thus, we have the system 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ïî
ï
í
ì
-
=
-=
tptvuttf
tptF
t
ttprtp
qq
qq
q
,&
&
. 
In this case we define ( ) ( ) ( )q
q
qq
0
00
d
dp
a º  and using the definition of ( )pF ,q  it follows that 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )ò -¢
-= q
q
mq
qqqq
xdpxvu
fpvu
a
0
. 
As in the basic model it can be shown that generically it must be that ( ) ( )1,0Îº Saa q .  It 
can be checked that all propositions from sections 3 and 4 are still valid for the extended 
model when we use the new notion of ( )qa . 
5.2 Depreciation 
The situation changes when the good under consideration is not perfectly durable and 
depreciates over time.  Let [ )¥Î ,0d  be the rate at which goods depreciate.  This implies 
that the quality owned by a seller i , who entered the market at it , becomes a function of 
time: ( ) ( )ittii t --= dqq e .  We normalize sellers' gross utility flow to be equal to ( ) ( )tr iqd+ , 
instead of irq , as in the basic model.  The rest of the model remains as in the basic model. 
If a seller i  sells at time itt ³  against ( )tp  his net discounted surplus equals 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ittrti itpts qd --- -= ee . 
Maximizing surplus with respect to the selling time itt ³ , assuming ( )tp  is twice 
differentiable, yields ( )prpr &-= +dq 1  as the marginal quality traded at time t .  The second 
order condition in this case becomes 0>+dqq& . 
In a similar way as we have done in section 3, one can derive the system describing 
the dynamic behavior of prices and marginal qualities: 
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( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )ïî
ï
í
ì
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ -
--
-=
+-=
1
e
1
qmqmq
qhqmdqq
q
d
d
t
r
pv
vp
prp
&
&
. 
Proposition 3.1 remains valid for the extension considered here.9  Taking without loss of 
generality 1=r , we get the following system: 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )ïî
ï
í
ì
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-
--
-=
+-=
1
e
1
qmqmq
qhqmdqq
qd
dtpv
vp
pp
&
&
. (6) 
The main new feature of (6) is that the system becomes autonomous for large t  when 
qq d ³te , which is guaranteed by the second order condition 0>+dqq& , and, therefore, 
( ) ( )qmqm d =te .  In other words, for large t  the system (6) becomes independent of t . 
We start our analysis arguing that if d+< 1v , then in any continuous equilibrium path 
( ) ( )( )tpt ,q  price decreases over time as ( ) ( ) ( ) 0111 <--=+-£+-= qdqdqqd vvpp& , 
and, therefore, ( )tq  must drop below q  at a certain time.  From this moment on q  
decreases exponentially with rate d , which implies that all sellers with quality higher than 
q  will never sell and sellers with quality lower than q  have already sold.  Hence, in case 
d+< 1v  there is no trade after a certain time.  Note that this condition is somewhat similar 
to the case 1<v  in the basic model.  Buyers do not value the good enough and there can be 
no trade.  From now on we assume d+> 1v . 
Now we will show that there exists a steady state ( )** p,q , not necessarily unique, 
such that for all *³ q
q
d ln
1t 10 ( ) ( )( ) ( )**= ptpt ,, qq  is a solution of system (6).  Indeed, 
solving for ( ) ( ) 0== tpt &&q  yields: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )îí
ì
=-----+
+=
*****
**
011
1
qmqmdqqhdqqm
qd
vv
p
. (7) 
Note that at qq =*  the left-hand side of the second equation is negative, while at qq =*  it 
is positive.  Therefore, there exists at least one point ( )qqq ,Î*  such that the left-hand side 
equals zero.  Hence, there is at least one steady state. 
                                                 
9 If we introduce 
r
dd =*  as a "relative depreciation rate" the structure of the system allows us to get rid of r  
by substitution rt=y . 
10 This condition follows from setting qq d ³te  and solving for t . 
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The natural question about the local stability of the singular point ( )** p,q  can be 
resolved by taking a linear analysis of (6) in the neighborhood of ( )** p,q .  One can derive 
the following sufficient conditions for ( )** p,q  to be stable: 11+-> vvd . 
In the scope of this paper we will not fully investigate the solution of (6).  We first 
observe that the conclusions reached concerning the basic model generalize when the 
depreciation rate d  is small enough.  Let us consider an example, where 10=q , 20=q , 
( ) ( )qqq -= 1.0ef , 2.1=v  and 01.0=d .   Figure 5.1 shows that all goods can be sold in finite 
time even if there exists a stationary equilibrium (which is unstable) denoted by a cross in 
the figure.  Proposition 5.1 generalizes this example and argues that we can extend the 
conclusion of Proposition 4.2 to the case where d  is small enough. 
Proposition 5.1.  If 21>a , then there exists a 0>d  such that for all [ )dd ,0Î  there exist 
an infinite number of cyclical dynamic equilibria ( ) ( )( )ddq ,,, tpt  such that for some 
0>dT : 
a) ( ) ( )tpTtp =+ d  and ( ) ( )tTt qq d =+ ; 
b) ( ) qq d =T ; 
c) ( )dq ,t  and ( )d,tp  are continuous functions on ( )dTt ,0Î . 
The proof relies on the fact that the system (6) can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )îí
ì
+-=
--=
- tpGvp
pp
tfpv ,,
11 qdqhqmq
dqq
qq
&
&
, (8) 
where 
Figure 5.1. 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )pv
t
f
f
vp
tpG
t
t
--
-
--
×-º qq
qmqm
d
qmqmqq
q
qhqmq
d
d
e
e
,, . 
As ( )tpG ,,q  is finite for all p , 0>t , 0>d  and [ ]eqqq -Î , , system (3) is an 
approximation of (6) for small d . 
When d  is larger qualitatively new phenomena may emerge in equilibrium.  This is 
shown in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 by means of examples.  Figure 5.2 shows that the 
stable steady state can be either below the static equilibrium (left graph, where 10=q , 
20=q , ( ) ( )qqq --= ef , 2.1=v , 1.0=d , 82.11* »q  and 01.13»Sq ) or above the static 
equilibrium (right graph, where 10=q , 30=q , ( ) ( )qqq --= 01.0ef , 2.1=v , 1.0=d , 
32.17* »q  and 94.14»Sq ).  Unlike the static equilibrium in the basic model, in these 
stationary equilibria all qualities are eventually traded in the market.  However, owners of 
qualities *qq >i  first wait until their good has depreciated to 
*q  before selling. 
Figure 5.2. 
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In the second case, Figure 5.3, where 10=q , 20=q , ( ) ( )qqq --= ef , 2.1=v  and 
09.0=d , d  is "slightly" below 1
1
+
-
v
v .  Then ( )** p,q  is not stable but there exists a cycle, 
i.e., a periodical solution of the corresponding autonomous system.  In the long run, prices 
as well as marginal quality fluctuate with an asymptotically constant period. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have provided a different perspective on the way the adverse selection 
problem may manifest itself in durable good markets, where entry takes place and trading 
occurs in continuous time.  In the static Akerlof-Wilson model, adverse selection results in 
high quality goods not being able to trade despite the potential gains from trade.  The 
infinite repetition of this static equilibrium is also an equilibrium in the dynamic model 
where a durable good is traded in a competitive market.  One result of this paper, however, 
says that there are infinitely many other equilibria where all goods are sold within finite 
time after entering the market.  This result holds true even if consumers are not risk-neutral 
or when the good is not perfectly durable.  When the depreciation rate is above a critical 
value, however, new stationary equilibria emerge where all goods are eventually traded.  In 
this type of equilibrium, owners of high quality goods sell only after the good has 
depreciated enough. 
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Appendix. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. 
Under Assumption 2.1 for any 00 >t  and ( )00 , pq  such that 00 pv ¹q  system (3) has a 
unique solution ( ) ( )( )000000 ,,,,,,, tptptpt qqq  with initial conditions ( ) 00 qq =t  and 
( ) 00 ptp = , which is continuous w.r.t. 0q  and 0p .  Considering q&  as a function of q , p  
and t , i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )pvtf
vp
tp
-
-ºQ=
qq
qhqmqq ,,& , allows us to take the following limit 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ¥<-
-=
-
-=Q
®® 000
000
lim,,lim
00 pvf
vp
pvf
vp
tpt
tt qq
qhqm
qq
qhqmq . 
Therefore, system (3) has a solution even for 00 =t , but not necessarily unique.  
Uniqueness of the solution is guaranteed by the fact that ( ) lqq +º/Q tpt ,, , where l  is a 
constant.  Finally, that solution is differentiable at 0=t  as long as ( )( ) 0,,lim
0
=Q
®
tpt
t
q , i.e., 
( )00 qhvp = , and we will denote it as 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )0,,,,0,,,,,, 000000 qhqqhqqqqq vtpvttpt º .  Indefiniteness of ( )0,0 qq&  is 
resolved by continuity: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
t
vp
pvfpvtf
vp
t
ttt
qh
qq
qm
qq
qhqmqqqq -
-
=
-
-==
®®® 0
000
0
0000
limlim,lim,0 && . 
Using the mean value theorem we have that the later expression equals 
( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,
1,,,lim1
,,,
lim
1
0
0
0
000
0
020201
0
0
02020010
0
0
q
q
qq
q
qxqqxqqx
q
qxqqxqqhqx
q
&&&&
&&
&&
-=-=-=
=+-+
®
®
a
pap
at
tttattp
a
t
tttavttpp
a
t
t
 
where ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )0
000
0
0
qm
qhqqqh
q
q
qq
-=÷
ø
öç
è
æº
=
vf
v
d
d
a , 
( )1,01 Îx , ( )1,02 Îx  and ( )00 ,0 qqq && º , ( )00 ,0 qpp && º .  Rewriting yields ( ) 02 10 0 pa && qq = .
11  
Hence, ( ) ( ) ( )
0
00
0
0
0
2
==
÷
ø
öç
è
æ=>==÷
ø
öç
è
æ
tt
v
d
d
aa
p
d
dp qh
q
qq
qq &
&
. 
                                                 
11 If it had been that ( ) lqq +ºQ tpt ,, , or equivalently, tlqq +=& , then we would have had 
( ) ( ) ( )0limlim0 1000 qq
qlq && & ===
®
+
® ttt
, that is identity.  Therefore, in this case ( )0q&  is not defined and can be chosen 
arbitrarily, that gives rise to multiple solutions. 
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This implies that for small 0>t  ( ) ( )( )00 ,, qqhq tvtp >  as long as ( ) 0000 >-= qqhvp& . 
Now we define 0q  as ( ) ( ){ }qqhqqqqq >¢Î"¢= vS :,inf0  and Uˆ  as ( ) UU S Ç= qq ,ˆ 0  
such that for all Uˆ0 Îq  ( ) 00 qqh >v . 
Finally, we will show that there exists a neighborhood UU ˆÌ  such that for any 
solution ( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt  of (3), where UÎ0q , there exists a time ( ) 00 >qT  such that for 
all ( )Tt ,0Î  q>p  and ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 0=-- TTTp qqq , i.e., either all goods are sold or the 
marginal surplus is zero at time T .  If this were not the case then there would have been 
qq ¢==
¥®¥® tt
p limlim 12.  But then the equation 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )pvtf
vp
-
-=
qq
qhqmq&  for large t  becomes 
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ +
¢-¢
¢-¢¢= t
vf
v
t
e
qq
qhqqmq
1
1& , where ( ) 0lim =
¥®
t
t
e , and, therefore, 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) consttvf
v
t +
¢-¢
¢-¢¢> ln
12 qq
qhqqmq  
for sufficiently large t .  Hence, ( ) ¥=
¥®
t
t
qlim  unless ( ) 0=¢-¢ qhq v , i.e., Sqq =¢ . 
In order to rule out the possibility that Sqq =¢  (and, hence, that ( )0,qq t  and ( )0,qtp  
converge to qq <¢ ) we rewrite system (3) as follows 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )ïïî
ïï
í
ì
÷÷
÷
ø
ö
çç
ç
è
æ
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-
-¢
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-
-
+---=
---=
S
S
S
S
SS
SS
p
p
p
ap
at
pp
q
qq
q
q
qq
qqqq
qqq
,1 B&
&
, 
where ( )Saa q=  and ( ) ¥<p,qB  uniformly13 in a certain neighborhood of Sq  UU ˆÌ .  
Thus, for all UÎ0q  the solution ( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt  can be written as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )î
í
ì
-+-+=
-+-+=
000
000
ˆ,
ˆ,
qqqqqq
qqqqqqq
SSS
SSS
otytp
otxt
, 
where ( ) ( )( )tytx ˆ,ˆ  solves the corresponding linearized system 
( )î
í
ì
-=
-=
axyx
xyy
at
1&
&
, (9) 
                                                 
12 As p  and q are increasing and bounded: qq < , qq vvp << , and ( )q-==
¥®¥®
pp
tt
lim0lim & . 
13 The proof of this claim is available from the authors. 
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with initials ( ) 10 -=x , ( ) ay -=0 .  Defining ( ) ( )( )tx tytk =  allows us to rewrite (9) as 
( )atkakkk ----= 1& .  Obviously, for all ( )¥Î ,0t  0<x , 0<y  and axy > .14  Hence, 
( )ak ,0Î  and for sufficiently large t  021 <-< -ak&  and, therefore, ( ) -¥=¥® tktlim , which is 
in contradiction with ( )ak ,0Î . 
So, for any UÎ0q  ( ) 00 >$ qT  such that either ( ) qqq =0,T  or ( ) ( )00 ,, qqq TpT = .  In 
both cases we extend ( )p,q  in a periodic way, namely ( ) ( )tpTtp =+  and ( ) ( )tTt qq =+ .  
In order to show that ( ) ST qq >  when ( ) ( ) qq <= TpT  let us consider two cases. 
a) ( ) ST qq = .  This contradicts with the uniqueness of the solution with initials 
( ) ST qq = .  Indeed, we always have a static solution ( ) ( ) SSS tpt qqqq == ,,  and we 
have found another, namely ( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt , such that ( ) ( ) STpT qqqq == 00 ,, . 
b) ( ) ST qq < .  This implies that ( )( ) ( )TTv qqh > , which can never happen as for small t  
( )( ) ( )ttv qqh <  and no solution may cross the curve ( )qhvp =  from above at Sqq < . 
Hence, ( ) ST qq > . 
As we have obtained a discontinuous function ( )tp , we lost the sufficiency of the first 
and second order conditions.  So, we must check the optimality of the stipulated sellers 
behavior directly. 
Let us take any seller i  with quality iq  and entry time ( )[ )TnnTti 1, +Î , where n  is 
the entry cycle's number.  If ( )Ti qq >  then he will never sell, which is clearly optimal for 
him.  If, on the other hand, ( )Ti qq <  then there are two possibilities. 
a) ( )ii tqq > .  In this case he maximizes his surplus by selling in the current cycle n  at 
time ( )ii qt , where ( ) ii qtq = , and getting ( ) ( )iii ss tt = , see Figure A.1(a), and it 
follows that ii t>t
15.  Indeed if he had been waiting for the next cycle ( )1+n  he 
would have chosen time ( ) Tiii +=¢ tqt  to sell, where ( ) ii qtq =¢ , and got ( ) ( )iii ss tt ¢=¢ .  
But ( ) ( ) ( )iii pTpp ttt ¢=+=  and the seller i  will certainly choose the earlier time it . 
                                                 
14 As 
Sqq < , Sp q<  and ( )qhvp > . 
15 Within a cycle the first and second order conditions still work so there is a unique optimal selling time 
it . 
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b) ( )ii tqq < .  In this case let us first investigate the marginal surplus function 
( ) ( )q-º - pts te .  From (3) it follows that 
ts
d
ds --== e
qq &
&
. 
Although the above expression has been obtained only for [ ]Tt ,0Î  it holds for any 
[ )¥Î ,0t .  To see this, suppose ( )( ]TnnTt 1, +Î .  It then follows that 
( ) ( ) ( ) tnTtnTnT nTt
d
ds
t
d
ds ----- -=-=--= eeee
qq
 for all [ )¥Î ,0t . (10) 
Hence, ( )ts  is a positive, decreasing and convex function on ( )( )TnnT 1, + .  These 
properties allow us to validate the maximum principle across different continuous 
segments of an equilibrium path. 
Now let us define ( )ii qt  such that ( )( ]TnnTi 1, +Ît  and ( ) ii qtq = , in this case ii t<t , 
see Figure A.1(b).  If seller i  sells immediately after the entry, i.e., at time it , he gets 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )iitiiitiitiitii ttstttptpts iiii qqqqqq -+=-+-=-= ---- eeee , 
while if he waits until the next cycle ( )1+n  he will choose time ( ) Tiii +=¢ tqt  to sell, 
where ( ) ii qtq =¢ , and, therefore, his surplus becomes 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )iiiiiii spps ii ttqtqtt tt ¢=¢-¢=-¢=¢ -¢- ee . 
In order to show that ( ) ( )¢> iiii sts t  for all ( )ii tqq <  let us consider 
( ) ( ) ( )iiiii sts tq ¢-ºD  as a function of iq  and apply the mean-value theorem: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) *ee* iiiiTiddsiiii ttsTtTtss tq qqtqtqt -- -+=+-¢++=¢ , 
Figure A.1. 
( )ts
0q qˆ( )itq iq
( )iis t
( )itq ¢
( )iis t ¢
( )itq ( )tq
Case a) 
( )itq
( )ts
0q ( )tqqˆ( )itqiq
( )ii ts
( )itq ¢
( )iis t ¢
Case b) 
( )its
( )*itq
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for some ( )Ttiii +¢Î ,* tt .  Then 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( ) .0eee1
eee
*
*
>--+-=
=----+=D
---
---
ii
ii
t
ii
T
i
iii
T
ii
t
ii
tts
ttstts
t
t
qq
qqqqq
 
Therefore, we have shown that for any UÎ0q  ( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt  constitutes a dynamic 
equilibrium trading all goods from the range [ qq ˆ, ], where ( ) ST qqq >=ˆ .  
In order to prove the following propositions we need the following lemma. 
Lemma 1.  For any Suppose that for any numbers ( )qqq ,0 SÎ  and ( )000 , qq vp Î  there 
exists 0ˆ >t , depending on 00 q-p , such that for all tt ˆ0 >  system (3) has a unique solution 
with initials ( ) 00 qq =t  and ( ) 00 ptp = .  Moreover, there exists a finite time tT ˆ>  such that 
( ) qq =T . 
Proof.  Under Assumption 2.1 for any 0t  system (3) has a unique solution passing through 
( )00 , pq .  All we need to show then is the existence of T  if 0t  is taken to be sufficiently 
large.  We define { }Svp qqa 2100 ,min --º  and 
( )
( ) Sfv
v
t
aqe
qqm
1
2ˆ
-
º . (11) 
As a  is a function of 00 q-p  so is tˆ .  Now let us consider the solution mentioned above 
when tt ˆ0 >  and suppose that ( ) ( ) aq =- ttp  for some 0tt ³ .  Then 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ -=÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ -=-=- 11
t
tp
t
d
dp
tttp
d
d
tttp
dt
d
q
q
q
qq
q
qq &
&&&& . 
Using (3) yields 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )
( )( )
( )
( )
( ) .012
1ˆ1
1
1
1
1
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1
0
0
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ö
ççè
æ
-
-
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ö
ççè
æ
-
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>
>÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-
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>÷÷ø
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ççè
æ
-
-
--=-
-
qqm
aqe
q
qqm
qqae
q
qm
aqae
q
qhqm
qqqqq
v
v
t
v
v
t
p
v
t
vp
pvpf
tttp
dt
d
SfS
v
Sf
f
&&
&&
 
Thus ( ) ( ) 0>>- aq ttp  for all 0tt ³ .  Now it becomes clear (see Proof of Proposition 
3.2.) that for some T  we must have ( ) qq =T .  
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Proof of Proposition 4.1. 
We first define functions ( ) ( )( )tpt ,q  for all [ ]0,0 tt Î  and some 0t  such that the condition of 
Lemma 1 is satisfied, i.e., ( ) ( )( )000 ˆ ttptt q-> , and ( ) St qq =0 .  Then we show that 
( ) ( )( )tpt ,q  actually is an equilibrium path.  Lastly, Lemma 1 says that all goods are traded 
by a certain time T . 
In section 3 we have shown that for any UÎ0q  and ( )00 qhvp =  system (3) has a 
solution ( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt  and ( ) ST qq >  for some T .  As ( ) 0, 0 >qq t& , it follows that for all 
( )[ ]Tqqb ,0Î  there exists an inverse ( )0,qbt  such that ( )( ) bqqbq =00 ,,t .  Function 
( )0,qbt  is continuously differentiable on ( )[ ]Tqqb ,0Î  and continuous w.r.t. 0q .  Hence, 
( )( )00 ,, qqbtp  is continuous w.r.t. 0q  as well.  We define ( )0qt  by ( ) ( )00 ,qqqt St= , so that 
( )( ) Sqqqtq =00 ,  for all UÎ0q .  Note that ( )( ) ( )( ) Sp qqqtqqqt => 0000 ,, . 
Now we will solve the linearized system (9).  Firstly, it can be rewritten as Kummer's 
equation (see Abramowitz and Stegun, 1972, pp. 504-515): 
( ) ( ) 02 1 =---+ -aaxxtxt &&& . 
with initials ( ) 10 -=x , ( ) aax 210 -=& .  The unique solution is the negative to the so-called 
Kummer's function ( )taaM ,, 21 , with aaa --= 11  and 22 =a .  Turning back to (9): 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )ï
ï
î
ï
ï
í
ì
÷÷ø
ö
ççè
æ
-G
-G-+-=--=
-G+
-G-+-=--=
å
å
¥
=
-
-
-
¥
=
-
-
-
1
12
1
1
1
1
1
1
1!
1
1,2,ˆ
1!1!
1
1,2,ˆ
n
n
a
a
a
a
a
a
dt
d
n
n
a
a
a
a
a
a
t
n
n
a
a
attMaty
t
nn
n
a
a
tMtx
, (12) 
where ( ) ò
¥ --=G
0
1e dttx xt  is the Gamma-function, and 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )aaaaa
a
a
n
n 111
1
1
32
1
-´´--=
-G
-G
-
-
K . 
Now we define w  as ( ) 0ˆ =wx  and it follows that 0>w  and ( ) 0ˆ >wy .  As 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )î
í
ì
-+-+=
-+-+=
000
000
ˆ,
ˆ,
qqqqqq
qqqqqqq
SSS
SSS
otytp
otxt
, 
the functions ( )txˆ  and ( )tyˆ  describe the behavior of the solution ( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt  in the 
neighborhood of Sp qq ==  and it follows that 
( ) wqt
qq
=
®
0
0
lim
S
, 
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( )( ) ( )w
qq
qqqt
qq
y
p
S
S
S
ˆ,lim
0
00
0
=
-
-
®
. 
Therefore, there exists a left neighborhood of the static equilibrium quality 
( ) UU S Îº qqww ,0  such that for all wq UÎ0  ( ) wqt 210 > . 
Now we are ready to construct the pair of functions ( ) ( )( )tpt ,q .  Let us take any 
( ) wq UÎ10  and define 
( ) ( )( )101 qtt º , ( )( ) ( )( )101 ,qqq tt º  and ( )( ) ( )( )101 ,qtptp º  on Ît ( ( )1,0 t ], 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )ttpts t 111 e q-º - .  By construction we have ( ) wt 211 >  and ( ) ( )( ) 011 >ts . 
Let us now consider the function ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )110001 , tqqqtqr sp S --º  as a function of 
0q .  It is continuous on [
( )
Sqq ,
1
0 ].  Moreover, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0e, 1111111010101 1 >--+=--= tqtqtqqqtqr t sssp SSS , and 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0e, 11111 1 <--=--= tqqtqqqtqr t ssp SSSSSS . 
Therefore, ( ) ( )( )Sqqq ,1020 Î$  depending on ( )0qt  such that ( ) ( )( ) 0201 =qr , i.e., 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )112020 , tqqt sp = .  Again, we define ( ) ( )( )202 qtt º , ( )( ) ( )( )202 ,qqq tt º  and 
( )( ) ( )( )202 ,qtptp º  on ( )( ]2,0 tÎt , ( )( ) ( )( )202 ,qtsts º  and, again, ( ) wt 212 > . 
Repeating this process, we get a sequence ( ){ }kt  such that ( ) ¥=å
=
¥®
k
j
j
k
1
lim t .  We define 
1³K  to be the smallest number such that ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1111
1
ˆ tqtt ->å
=
pt
K
j
j .  Then, we define 
( )kt  as ( ) ( )å
+=
=
K
kj
jkt
1
t , so that ( ) 0=Kt , ( ) ( )KKt t=-1 , ( ) ( ) ( )12 -- += KKKt tt ,…, ( ) ( ) tt
K
j
j ˆ
1
0 >= å
=
t .  
Finally, we define an equilibrium path for Ît ( ( )0,0 t ] as follows 
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ kk ttptp -=0,q , if Ît ( ( ) ( )1, -kk tt ], 
( ) ( ) ( )( ){ kk ttt -= qqq 0, , if Ît ( ( ) ( )1, -kk tt ], 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ kkt ttsts k -= -e, 0q , if Ît ( ( ) ( )1, -kk tt ]. 
For ( )0tt >  we take the solution ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )0010100101 ,,,,,,, ttpttpttptt qqq  of (3) 
as an equilibrium path. 
It can be easily seen that within every interval ( ( ) ( )1, -kk tt ] a seller chooses the time to 
trade optimally.  In order to check that he behaves optimally even across those intervals 
(subcycles) and across cycles, again, like in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we use (10) and 
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considering a seller i  with quality iq  and entry time Îit (
( ) ( )1, -++ kk tnTtnT ].  As the 
arguments are quite similar to the ones given in the proof of Proposition 3.2 we skip the 
details here. 
Like in Proposition 3.2 any seller i  optimally waits until the first moment after entry 
when the marginal quality is larger than or equal to his own quality.  Hence, the pair of 
functions ( ) ( )( )tpt ,q  constructed above satisfies all equilibrium requirements.  Then, it 
follows from Lemma 1 that T$  such that ( ) qq =T .  The constructed equilibrium path is 
entirely determined by choosing ( )10q  which is an arbitrary point from 
wU .  Therefore, we 
have obtained infinitely many (continuum of) equilibria.  
Proof of Proposition 4.2. 
If 2
1>a , then each term (apart from the constant) in the Tailor expansion (12) is positive 
as ( ) 01 1 >-G -aa  and its radius of convergence is infinity.  Hence, xˆ  and yˆ  are defined by 
(12) for all [ )¥Î ,0t , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) +¥====
+¥®+¥®+¥®+¥®
txtytxty
tttt
&& ˆlimˆlimˆlimˆlim , and 
( ) +¥=ú
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-=-=-==
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ˆ
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1ˆˆˆˆˆˆ
, 
as ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 01!1!21ˆ2ˆˆˆˆˆ 2 1
11
>
-G+-
-G
-=->->- å
¥
=
-
--
n a
a
n
a
a
nn
tn
axayxyxay &&&&&&  for all 0>t . 
This implies that for 2
1>a  
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) +¥==-+
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+¥®®+¥®®+¥® tx
ty
Otx
Oty
t
tp
t
S
S
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S
S
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limlim
,
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limlim
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0
00 qq
qq
qqq
qq
qqqq
. 
In other words, for any 0>M  ( )Mt¢$  such that for all tt ¢>  ( ) ( )( )Saa MtMtU qq ,,, 0=$  
such that for all aUÎ0q : 
( )
( ) Mt
tp
S
S >
-
-
qqq
qq
0
0
,
,
. 
We take S
v qa 2
1-= , ( ) 212 >== - Sv
vvM q
q
a
q  and ( ) ( ){ }MttMM ¢= - ,ˆmax 1 at ,  where ( )Ktˆ  is as 
defined (11), Lemma 1.  Then it follows that 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )11
2
1
2
1
2
--
=
--
³
Mv
M
v
v
M
M
SfSf qe
qm
aqe
qmqt . 
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For this t  there exists a neighborhood ( )MU a ,t  such that for all aUÎ0q  
( )
( ) M
p
S
S >
-
-
qqtq
qqt
0
0
,
,
. 
We will show that t³¢¢$t  such that ( ) ( ) aqqq +¢¢³¢¢ 00 ,, ttp .  Suppose to the contrary 
that ( ) ( ) aqqq +< 00 ,, ttp  for all t³t .  Then it must be the case that 
( )
( ) Mt
tp
S
S ³
-
-
qqq
qq
0
0
,
,
, 
for all t³t , otherwise there would have been some t³¢¢¢t  such that 
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S
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0
,
,
, 
and, therefore, for tt ¢¢¢=  
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where ( )qqx ,SÎ .  But then ( )( )SMp qqq -->- 1  and ¥=®¥ qtlim , which is not possible. 
So ( ) ( ) aqqq +¢¢³¢¢ 00 ,, ttp  for some ( ) ( ) ( )( )00 ,,ˆˆ qqqat ttpttt ¢¢-¢¢³>³¢¢  and 
Lemma 1 applies.  
Proof of Proposition 5.1. 
One can see that for any fixed 0q  the solution ( ) ( )( )dqdqq ,,,,, 00 tpt  of (8) converges to the 
solution ( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt  of (3): 
( ) ( ) ( )0000 ,0,,,,lim qqqqdqqd ttt ==® , and 
( ) ( ) ( )0000 ,0,,,,lim qqdqd tptptp ==®  
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uniformly for all t  provided ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) *000 ,,, eqqhqqqm >- tvtpt  and 
( ) ( ) *00 ,, eqqq >- ttp  for an arbitrary small 0* >e , in other words, for all ( )tt Tt ee -Î ,  
At 0=t  convergence is preserved as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 00000000 ,,01,,0lim,,0lim pppp && =-=+-= ®® qdqqddqdq dd , and 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 02 ,02,,0000 0
0
0
000lim,,0lim qdqq q
q
q
qqddq
dd
&& && === -
®® a
p
a
ap . 
As 21>a  then there exists a left neighborhood of Sq , namely 
aU , such that for all 
aUÎ0q  the solution ( ) ( )( )00 ,,, qqq tpt  satisfies all the requirements.  This implies that 
( )dq ,t  and ( )d,tp  are continuous functions on [ ]tTt e-Î ,0  and at 0=d .  On the other 
hand, 
( ) ( ) qqqqeq
e
==-
®
00
0
,,lim TT t
t
, and 
( ) ( ) qqqe
e
>=-
®
00
0
,,lim TpTp t
t
. 
Let us take te  such that for all [ ]tee ,0Î : 
( ) qqe >- 0,Tp , and 
( )( ) ( ) ( )qmqhq
qqqeqm
vv
v
T
-
->- 0, . 
Now we define ( )ed  as the largest 0>d  such that 
( ) ( )qddqe +³- 1,, 0Tp , and 
( )( ) ( ) ( )qmqhq
qqdqeqm
vv
v
T
-
-³- ,, 0 . 
It can be easily seen that ( ) 0,, 0 >dqtp&  and ( ) 0,, 0 >dqq t&  for all [ )dd ,0Î  and e-> Tt .  
Moreover, ed ->$ TT  such that ( ) qdqq d =,, 0T  and ( ) qdqd >,, 0Tp .  
 
